Seifert, J., Cartwright, E., Cartwright, A. (2025) Cyber Risk Quantification and the Role of Markets. The economic cost of cybersecurity, forthcoming.
Meurs, T., Cartwright, E., Cartwright, A., Junger, M., & Abhishta, A. (2024). Deception in Double Extortion Ransomware Attacks: An Analysis of Profitability and Credibility. Computers & Security, 138, 103670.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103670
Cartwright, A. and Cartwright, E. (2024) A classroom market experiment: Data and Reflections. Journal of Economic Education, 1-16.https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2024.2351853
Cartwright, A., Cartwright, E., Xue, L., & Hernandez-Castro, J. (2023). An investigation of individual willingness to pay ransomware. Journal of Financial Crime, 30(3), 728-741. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-02-2022-0055
Cartwright, A. and Cartwright, E. (2023) The economics of ransomware attacks on integrated supply chain networks. Digital Threats: Research and Practice, Volume 4, Issue 4, Article No. 56 (pp. 1-14).https://doi.org/10.1145/3579647
Cartwright A., Cartwright E., MacColl, J., Mott, G., Turner, S., Sullivan, J. and Nurse, J.R.C. (2023) How cyber-insurance influences the ransomware payment decision: theory and evidence. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 48(2), 300-331. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41288-023-00288-8.
Cartwright, A., Cartwright, E., & Edun, E. S. (2023). Cascading information on best practice: Cyber security risk management in UK micro and small businesses and the role of IT companies. Computers & Security, 131, 103288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103288
Meurs, T., Cartwright, E. and Cartwright, A. (2023) Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware. In International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (pp. 311-328). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3_16
Meurs, T., Cartwright, E. and Cartwright, A., Junger, M., Hoheisel, R., Tews, E. and Abhishta, A. (2023) Ransomware Economics: A Two-Step Approach To Model Ransom Paid. In 2023 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime), pp. 1-13. IEEE.https://doi.org/10.1109/eCrime61234.2023.10485506
Mott, G., Turner, S., Nurse, J. R., MacColl, J., Sullivan, J., Cartwright, A., & Cartwright, E. (2023). Between a rock and a hard (ening) place: Cyber insurance in the ransomware era. Computers & Security, 128, 103162.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103162
Bhudia, A., Cartwright, A., Cartwright, E., Hernandez-Castro, J., & Hurley-Smith, D. (2023). Identifying Incentives for Extortion in Proof of Stake Consensus Protocols. In The International Conference on Deep Learning, Big Data and Blockchain (pp. 109-118). Springer, Cham.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16035-6_9
Cartwright, E., Cartwright, A. (2022) Chapter 23: Behavioural public policy. De Gruyter Handbook of Contemporary Welfare States, 1, 389.https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110721768-023
Bhudia, A., Cartwright, A., Cartwright, E., Hernandez-Castro, J., & Hurley-Smith, D. (2022). Extortion of a Staking Pool in a Proof-of-Stake Consensus Mechanism. In 2022 IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems (COINS) (pp. 1-6). IEEE.https://doi.org/10.1109/COINS54846.2022.9854946
Hernandez-Castro, J., Cartwright, E. and Cartwright, A. (2020) An economic analysis of ransomware and its welfare consequences. Royal Society Open Science, 7(3), 190023.https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.190023
Cartwright, A., and Cartwright, E. (2019) Ransomware and reputation. Games, 10(2), 26.https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020026
Cartwright, A., Cartwright, E., & Xue, L. (2019) Investing in prevention or paying for recovery - attitudes to cyber risk. In International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (pp. 135-151). Springer, Cham.https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020026
Cartwright, E., Stepanova, A. and Xue, L. (2019) Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21(5), 903-922.https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12359
Hernandez-Castro, J., Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2019) To pay or not: game theoretic models of ransomware. Journal of Cybersecurity, 5(1), tyz009.https://doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyz009
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2017) Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. International Journal of Game Theory, 46(4), 1163-1191.https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2015) The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters, vol. 134, issue C, pages 29-33.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032
Burr, C., Knauff, M. and Stepanova, A.(2013) On the Prisoner’s Dilemma in R&D with Input Spillovers and Incentives for R&D Cooperation. Mathematical Social Sciences 66:254-261.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.004
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2012) What do Students Learn from a Classroom Experiment: Not much, Unless they Write a Report on it. Journal of Economic Education 43: 48-57.https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2012.636710
Stepanova, A. and Tesoriere, A. (2011) R&D with Spillovers: Monopoly Versus Noncooperative and Cooperative Duopoly. The Manchester School 79:125-144.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02185.x
Amir, R. and Stepanova, A. (2006) Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly. Games and Economic Behavior 55:1-20.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004
Amir, R., Stepanova, A., Nannerup, N. and Eguiazarova, E. (2002) Monopoly Versus R&D-Integrated Duopoly, The Manchester School, 70, 88-100.https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00285